The impact of first-time imprisonment on marriage and divorce:a matched samples comparison in a Dutch conviction cohort by Apel, R. et al.
  
 University of Groningen
The impact of first-time imprisonment on marriage and divorce
Apel, R.; Blokland, A.; Nieuwbeerta, P.; Schellen, M. van
Published in:
Journal of Quantitative Criminology
DOI:
10.1007/s10940-009-9087-5
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2010
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Apel, R., Blokland, A., Nieuwbeerta, P., & Schellen, M. V. (2010). The impact of first-time imprisonment on
marriage and divorce: a matched samples comparison in a Dutch conviction cohort. Journal of Quantitative
Criminology, 26(2), 269-300. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9087-5
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
ORI GIN AL PA PER
The Impact of Imprisonment on Marriage and Divorce:
A Risk Set Matching Approach
Robert Apel • Arjan A. J. Blokland • Paul Nieuwbeerta •
Marieke van Schellen
Published online: 24 December 2009
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009
Abstract Marriage has a prominent place in criminological theory and research as one
institution that has the potential to genuinely foster desistance from a criminal career. Mass
imprisonment policies in the United States and elsewhere, therefore, pose a potential threat
of increased crime if they impede the ability of ex-prisoners to reintegrate into society by
stigmatizing them and limiting their chances in the marriage market. We use a long-term
study of a conviction cohort in The Netherlands to ascertain the effect that first-time
imprisonment has on the likelihood of marriage and divorce. The results suggest that the
effect of imprisonment on the likelihood of marriage (among unmarried offenders) is
largely a selection artifact, although there is very weak evidence for a short-lived impact
that does not persist past the first year post-release. This is interpreted as a residual
incapacitation effect. On the other hand, the results strongly suggest that the experience of
incarceration leads to a substantially higher divorce risk among offenders who are married
when they enter prison.
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Introduction
Although the rate of incarceration has slowed in the United States, at yearend 2006 the
incarceration rate (inmates in state or federal prisons, or in local jails) was an astonishing
751 per 100,000 residents, with a total confined population of almost 2.3 million (Sabol
et al. 2007, p. 4). In Europe as well, two-thirds of the 35 countries surveyed experienced
growth in their incarceration rate during the latter half of the 1990s and the early 2000s
(Aebi et al. 2006), albeit with incarceration rates that are a fraction of the US except in rare
instances (e.g., Russia). The Netherlands in particular, long known for its liberal penal
policies and comparatively low incarceration rate, witnessed remarkable prison growth
from the late 1970s to the present and currently has among the highest incarceration rates
in western Europe, at approximately 160 per 100,000 in 2005 (Downes 2007; Downes and
van Swaaningen 2007; Tonry and Bijleveld 2007).
A portion of the expansion in custodial sanctions—in the US and elsewhere—is
attributable to the fact that sentence lengths have increased for imprisoned offenders. An
additional influence, however, is growth in the use of incarceration as a presumptive
sanction for offenders that would historically have been assigned a non-custodial sanc-
tion—a phenomenon known as ‘‘net widening.’’ A growing international literature has
been attentive to the collateral consequences of net-widening imprisonment policies,
observing that the social costs of steadily rising prison admissions in an era of rapidly
declining crime rates might very well outweigh the crime-control benefits (Hagan and
Dinovitzer 1999). The potential irony of mass imprisonment is that, to the extent it has
unintended adverse effects on life outcomes that are correlated with criminal offending,
large-scale growth in the incarceration rate may actually exacerbate the crime problem
over the long run by stigmatizing an ever larger class of individuals (Pettit and Western
2004; Uggen et al. 2006).
One unintended consequence faced by ex-inmates might be felt acutely in the institution
of marriage. Specifically, a prison record might erode one’s prospects for family formation
by delaying or permanently disrupting the transition to marriage. Imprisonment might also
disrupt intact marriages by increasing the risk of divorce. In light of compelling research
demonstrating an inverse relationship between marriage and criminal behavior, such dif-
ficulties could inadvertently sustain an individual’s criminal career.1 There are potential
side effects also for crime control at an aggregate level. Mass imprisonment might very
well diminish the capacity of communities to exercise informal social control by further
weakening already fragile families (Lynch and Sabol 2004; Rose and Clear 1998; Western
et al. 2004).
In this study, we are interested in quantifying the causal impact that incarceration has on
an individual’s likelihood of marriage and divorce. We employ data from a long-term
study of a conviction cohort of Dutch offenders. Our study is unique in a number of
important respects. For example, we use panel data to prospectively identify periods of
imprisonment and assess the short- and long-term impact of such experiences on marriage
formation and stability. Because of the real possibility of endogeneity in the incarceration–
marriage relationship, we use as a comparison (i.e., counterfactual) sample only those
1 For example, Blokland and Nieuwbeerta (2005); Farrington and West (1995); Horney et al. (1995); King
et al. (2007); Laub et al. (1998); Laub and Sampson (2003); Ouimet and LeBlanc (1996); Piquero et al.
(2002); Sampson and Laub (1990, 1993); Sampson et al. (2006); Shover (1996); Warr (1998). These studies
rely heavily on samples that are considerably high risk, for example, Piquero et al.’s (2002) prospective
analysis from a sample of serious male offenders released from the California Youth Authority. For a much
more qualified perspective on the salience of marriage, see Giordano et al. (2002, 2007).
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individuals who were convicted of a crime at the same age but were not sentenced to a
custodial sanction, and use propensity score estimation to select from these a subset of
individuals who were at high risk of imprisonment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review research on the effect of
incarceration on marriage, and proffer several theoretical mechanisms that might account
for a disruptive effect of incarceration on marriage formation and stability. We then
describe the scope of the present effort to estimate the incarceration–marriage relationship.
Finally, we present the empirical results followed by an extended discussion and con-
cluding comments.
Existing Research on Incarceration and Marriage
Three datasets provide the only quantitative evidence pertaining to the effect of impris-
onment on the likelihood of marriage. For example, data from the Glueck delinquents
support the notion that juvenile incarceration disrupts marital unions in adulthood.
Sampson and Laub (1993) found that men sentenced to a reformatory as juveniles were
more likely to be divorced in young adulthood (ages 17–25) and middle adulthood (ages
25–32). In their model of the propensity to marry (in order to estimate the effect of
marriage on crime), Sampson et al. (2006) found that the length of juvenile incarceration
was inversely correlated with the probability of marriage throughout adulthood and into the
seventh decade of life. Thus, early imprisonment appears to erode a man’s long-term
marriage prospects. Evidence from the Glueck men also suggests that incarceration
impedes marriage formation in adulthood, both contemporaneously and in the short term.
For example, Sampson et al. (2006) found that the length of incarceration in the previous
year (as well as cumulative incarceration length) was inversely correlated with the prob-
ability of being married in the current year.
A pair of studies utilized the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS) to
estimate the effect of incarceration on family formation among a high-risk sample of
parents of newborn children. Western and McLanahan (2000) found that the cumulative
incarceration status of the father (at the first follow-up) was strongly related to whether or
not the family was intact, that is, whether the father resided with the child’s mother in
either a cohabiting or marital situation. Specifically, an incarceration history (as reported
by the father) reduced the odds of living together by 49% (odds ratio = 0.51). Using the
same dataset, Western et al. (2004) reported that the father’s incarceration history (as
reported by either the father or mother) was inversely associated with the likelihood of
cohabitation and marriage relative to non-residence (see also Western 2006).
Several recent studies using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79)
have investigated the relationship between incarceration and marriage. Western (2006)
observed that 40% of males with a prison record remained unmarried until age 40 com-
pared to just over 10% of never-incarcerated males. Lopoo and Western (2005) reported
that male offenders were significantly and substantially less likely to get married during
periods in which they were interviewed in an institution. In their discrete-time event
history model of first marriage using the 1979–2000 interviews, they estimated that the
odds of the transition to marriage were 78% lower (odds ratio = 0.22) for incarcerated
individuals compared to their non-incarcerated counterparts. Similar results were reported
from the 1983–2000 interviews by Huebner (2005; for race-specific analyses, see Huebner
2007) in a fixed-effects model of marriage, in which she estimated that the odds of being
married were 39% lower for currently incarcerated individuals (odds ratio = 0.61). One
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notable exception was the study by Raphael (2007) using the 1979–1996 interviews, who
found that current incarceration had no impact on the probability of never being married
once individual effects were controlled.
With respect to the long-term (versus contemporaneous) relationship between incar-
ceration and marriage in the NLSY79, Huebner (2005, 2007) reported that a history of
incarceration as an adult—from the 1983 survey onward, when all respondents were at
least 18 years of age—was inversely associated with the probability of marriage, but that
youthful incarceration (prior to the 1983 interview) was not correlated with marriage.
Raphael (2007) noted that having ever been incarcerated prior to the current interview was
associated with about a 14-point increase in the probability of having never been married.
Lopoo and Western (2005), on the other hand, observed no such effect of having ever been
incarcerated on transitions to marriage and divorce. The preponderance of evidence from
the NLSY79 suggests, therefore, that incarceration is inversely correlated with marriage,
although when measured contemporaneously, this is conceivably an incapacitation effect
of prison on marriage likelihood. The findings about the long-term or accumulative effect
of incarceration on marital transitions are more equivocal.
Research on the likelihood of divorce is rarer still, but the results are quite consistent.
Lopoo and Western (2005) and Western (2006) found that a transition to divorce was
significantly more likely to occur contemporaneous with periods of incarceration in the
NLSY79. In particular, there was an astonishing twofold increase in the odds of divorce
among individuals who were incarcerated relative to their non-incarcerated peers (odds
ratio = 2.99). In the FFCWS, Western (2006) similarly found that incarceration signifi-
cantly increased the risk of separation for men in marital or cohabitational unions, and in
fact it was among the strongest predictors in his model (odds ratio = 2.23). Thus, incar-
ceration appears to have a major disruptive effect on pre-existing unions.
Theoretical Considerations for the Impact of Incarceration on Marriage and Divorce
A number of plausible theoretical explanations can be marshalled to interpret the inverse
correlation between incarceration and marriage among unmarried offenders, or the positive
correlation between incarceration and divorce among married offenders. We consider
several possibilities below, although we caution that the review is not intended to be
exhaustive.
Signaling and the Stigma of Imprisonment
One mechanism by which incarceration would conceivably erode marriage prospects is
through the stigma of imprisonment and the ‘‘signal’’ that such a label transmits to
potential spouses. From the perspective of signaling theory and its sociological counter-
part—labeling theory—a prison record conveys (however, imperfectly) information about
a person that entails more than just his or her future risk of criminal behavior. For example,
it might communicate something about one’s prospects for success in the labor market,
about one’s ability to provide for a family, about the company that one chooses to keep,
about a potential spouse’s risk of becoming a victim of domestic violence, and so on. In
other words, a label of ‘‘ex-inmate’’ provides important information that is used by pro-
spective spouses to assess the labeled individual’s reputation, integrity, and future pros-
pects—criminal and non-criminal alike. If potential spouses are responsive to cues about
one’s ‘‘marriage potential,’’ it is conceivable that a prison record conveys, quite simply,
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that one is not marriage material. Incarceration would thus lead to exclusion from the pool
of eligible marriage partners because one is viewed as a less viable and attractive partner
(see Wilson 1987; Wilson and Neckerman 1986).
This perspective has been prominently featured in recent empirical work studying the
effect of incarceration on employment prospects, demonstrating that incarceration has a
detrimental and non-trivial impact on one’s employment prospects by reducing wages and
earnings (e.g., Western 2002). In a Milwaukee study of matched audit pairs, Pager (2003)
found that employers advertising entry-level job openings were less than half as likely to
call back applicants who reported a criminal history (a felony cocaine trafficking con-
viction with 18 months prison time). The unambiguous conclusion was that ‘‘criminal
records close doors in employment situations’’ (p. 956). A prison record would represent a
stigma in the marriage market as well if potential spouses impose a penalty for the eco-
nomic deficits that tend to accrue to ex-inmates.
In light of existing knowledge about the generality of offending, moreover, offenders
with a criminal history might be more likely—or more importantly from a signaling
perspective, might be perceived as being more likely—to commit violence against their
intimate partners. For example, Carbone-Lopez and Kruttschnitt (2007) discovered that
female inmates were at qualitatively higher risk of intimate violence prior to their
imprisonment when they were involved with men who themselves had a history of criminal
activity. Western (2006) noted that fathers with a prison record were significantly and
substantially more likely to inflict physical injury on the mothers of their children within
12 months of the child’s birth. Consequently, individuals with a prison record might signal
to prospective (or current) spouses that they are potentially violent.
Social Networks and Restriction of Marriage Opportunities
The foregoing stigmatization perspective presumes that current or prospective spouses
perceive ex-inmates to be undesirable marriage partners. However, stigmatization might
operate in a second, related way, by constraining the social networks of ex-inmates and
thereby limiting the opportunity to meet potential dating or marriage partners. While
crime-prone individuals might run in social circles and frequent geographic locations
dominated by like-minded others (through a process of self-selection or social homophily),
incarceration and the formal labeling process might exacerbate this tendency through a
process of subculture formation among similarly stigmatized individuals (see Braithwaite
1989). To the extent that policies of mass imprisonment create a society of outcasts
through processes of social exclusion (Becker 1963; Garfinkel 1956; Link et al. 1989),
incarceration might result in growing isolation from conventional peer contexts and
growing integration into criminal peer networks. This ‘‘criminal embeddedness,’’ or social
embeddedness in crime, would provide fewer opportunities than before to meet mar-
riageable partners (see Hagan 1993).
Incapacitation and ‘‘Time Out’’ from Marriage
For married offenders, incarceration imposes a period of time-out from the marriage.
Because incarceration often removes offenders from their communities of residence,
married inmates are physically isolated from their spouses and families, which can lead to
disruption in the quality of existing marital ties (Lopoo and Western 2005). The stress of
separation could lead to withdrawal and dissolution as alternative sources of emotional
support are sought by the ‘‘surviving’’ spouse. Additionally, the loss of economic support
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by the imprisoned individual might motivate a spouse to separate or divorce in the interest
of finding a new partner who can help stabilize the financial situation in the household,
particularly if children are present (see Phillips et al. 2006).
Criminal Propensity and Unobserved Heterogeneity
An entirely different view on the incarceration–marriage relationship flows from the
possibility that individuals sort themselves into certain institutional settings on the basis of
a differential tendency to consider the long-term consequences of their actions; what
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) refer to as self-control. Because individuals with low self-
control seek immediate gratification of their desires with minimal effort or long-term
planning, they are less likely to be married or, if married, will tend to have difficulty
maintaining a stable union: ‘‘People who lack self-control tend to dislike settings that
require discipline, supervision, or other constraints on their behavior’’ (Gottfredson and
Hirschi 1990, p. 157). Additionally, individuals with low self-control are theorized to be
self-centered, insensitive, and non-verbal; qualities that would also likely interfere with
union formation and stability. Simply put, non-marriage, an unstable marriage, and crime
are all manifestations of the versatility of individuals with low self-control.
Contributions of the Current Study
This paper aims to advance empirical research on the causal impact of imprisonment on
marriage formation and dissolution in several ways. First, any effect of incarceration might
stem from its stigmatizing potential, which is more likely a consequence of the first
experience of incarceration than of a repeat experience. Thus, we focus our analysis on
estimation of the effect of first-time imprisonment. This focus allows us to sidestep the
problem of feedback effects whereby imprisonment affects (reduces) the likelihood of
marriage, the lack of which in turn affects (increases) the likelihood of imprisonment. Such
non-recursivity increases the risk that any estimate of the effect of imprisonment on
marriage is contaminated by simultaneity bias; specifically, that any inverse relationship
between imprisonment and marriage is overestimated. We recognize that a focus on first-
time imprisonment limits the generality of our findings, but balanced against this cost is the
benefit of elimination of one important (and plausible) source of endogeneity.
Second, perhaps the most serious threat to the validity of a finding that incarceration
disrupts marriage stems from the observation that imprisonment is the sanction reserved
for individuals who commit the most serious crimes and individuals with the lengthiest
criminal histories. This is the problem of ‘‘stochastic selectivity’’ (Blumstein et al. 1993).
Great care must be given to accounting for a selection process that will tend to make
imprisoned individuals disproportionately prone to non-marriage or unstable marriage
compared to non-imprisoned individuals, simply because of the way that the criminal
justice system, at each decision point (arrest ? charging ? prosecution ? convic-
tion ? incarceration), filters only the highest-risk offenders in the pool through for further
processing. What this means in practice is that the most valid comparison sample for
imprisoned offenders is, other things equal, a sample of offenders who have been filtered
just as far into the criminal justice system but short of incarceration. We thus limit our
attention to individuals who have at least been convicted of a crime and employ propensity
score matching specifically designed to balance a variety of time-stable and time-varying
indicators of incarceration risk. Specifically, we employ a matching approach known as
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‘‘risk-set matching’’ that conditions directly on age of first incarceration. The estimated
propensity score in a risk set matching model represents a hazard, or the probability of
imprisonment among those with no prior prison experience.
Third, we consider how the impact of incarceration unfolds over time following
confinement by estimating yearly marriage and divorce probabilities for up to 5 years
following release. Although incarceration might indeed have an immediate impact on the
likelihood of marriage or divorce, it is more likely that such effects take several years to
accumulate. This is especially true in the case of divorce, where lengthy legal proceedings
can often delay formal dissolution of the marriage. At minimum, it is an empirical question
whether the effect of incarceration is felt in the short or long term.
Data and Measures
The analysis uses data from the Criminal Career and Life-Course Study (CCLS), a large-
scale longitudinal study carried out at The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and
Law Enforcement (NSCR) (Nieuwbeerta and Blokland 2003). The CCLS is based on a
representative sample of 4% of all cases of criminal offenses that were tried in The
Netherlands in 1977 (the CCLS builds on the work of Block and Van der Werff 1991; Van
der Werff 1986). The total sample consists of 5,164 individuals (for a recent analysis, see
Blokland et al. 2005).
The criminal careers of the offenders in the sample were reconstructed using abstracts
from the General Documentation Files (GDF) of the Criminal Record Office (‘‘rap
sheets’’). The GDF contain information on every criminal case registered by the police at
the Public Prosecutor’s Office. While the GDF contain information on all offenses that
have led to any type of judicial action, here we use only information on those offenses that
were either followed by a conviction or a prosecutorial disposition due to policy reasons—
referred to below as convictions—thereby excluding cases that resulted in an acquittal or a
prosecutorial disposition due to insufficient evidence.2 All convictions before 1977 as well
as any convictions in the period 1977–2003 were recorded. For each individual in the
sample we thus obtained data on the number of convictions per year starting at age 12 (the
minimum age of criminal responsibility in The Netherlands) up to the year 2003.3 When
applicable the GDF extracts also contain information on the length of imprisonment
following a conviction.
To obtain information on possible time-varying variables that might confound the
effect of imprisonment, data on life circumstances were collected from population reg-
istration data and added to the conviction histories. Since 1938 all Dutch citizens are
registered in their municipalities. Personal records in the population registration contain
2 In the Dutch criminal justice system, the public prosecutor has the discretionary power not to prosecute
every case forwarded by the police. The public prosecutor may decide to drop the case if prosecution would
probably not lead to conviction due to lack of evidence or for technical considerations (e.g., procedural or
technical waiver). The public prosecutor is also authorized to waive prosecution ‘‘for reasons of public
interest’’ (i.e., waiver for policy considerations). The Board of Prosecutors-General has issued national
prosecution guidelines under which a public prosecutor may decide to waive a case for policy reasons, for
example, if measures other than penal sanctions are preferable or more effective, prosecution would be
disproportionately unjust or ineffective in relation to the nature of the offense or the offender, or prosecution
would be contrary to the interest of the state or the victim (Tak 2003).
3 Note that in The Netherlands, a person is not given a ‘‘clean slate’’ upon becoming an adult. The extracts
used thus contain information on both juvenile and adult offenses.
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information on marriage and fertility history as well as date of death. Prior to electronic
registration (that is, prior to 1994), personal record cards were used that were sent to the
next town of residence every time a person moved. For individuals who had died before
1994 these personal record cards were retrieved from the Centre for Genealogy and
Heraldry. Based on personal details from 1977, we were able to trace 89.4% of the
original sample. Over one-half of those we were unable to trace were neither born nor
residing in The Netherlands in 1977, leaving a total of 4,615 individuals in the sample to
be analyzed.
For various reasons we restrict our attention to a subsample of the 4,615 individuals
for whom we have life-history data. First, because of the small number of women in the
dataset, and the even smaller number of women who were imprisoned, we excluded all
women from consideration (N = 424). Second, we limited the analysis to persons who
up to age 18 had not been imprisoned, a criterion that led to the exclusion of another 342
men. We made this decision because marriage is non-existent in the CCLS prior to this
age. Third, we excluded the 17 individuals who died within 5 years subsequent to their
year of first imprisonment. Fourth, as expounded below we contrasted those imprisoned
for the first time with those convicted but not (yet) imprisoned. We thus limited our
sample to persons who had at least one conviction between ages 18 and 38, excluding
about a third of the remaining men. These sample restrictions result in an analysis
sample of 2,790 individuals who contribute 5,264 person-years of criminal conviction
information.
First-Time Imprisonment
Data on imprisonment were culled from the GDF extracts. All sentences involving
detention irrespective of their length were counted as imprisonment. Of all males for whom
data on life circumstances were available, 57.4% were sentenced to imprisonment at least
once during their offending careers up to calendar year 2003. Offenders were imprisoned
for the first time as young as age 12, with a mean age of first imprisonment of 23.4 years
and a median of 21 years (the interquartile range is 19–26 years). The length of first
imprisonment ranges from 1 day to 42 months, with an average of 14 weeks or about
three-and-a-half months.4
The decision to make estimation of the incarceration effect between ages 18 and 38 our
primary focus was influenced by two primary considerations. One was that a sizable
number of individuals were first imprisoned during this age span. As shown in Fig. 1,
80.7% of all imprisoned persons were first imprisoned between 18 and 38 years of age.
Second, we were interested in examining the impact of adult imprisonment on the like-
lihood of marriage, leading us to choose the age of majority (18) as the starting point for
the accumulation of a prison record. This refers to the age at which offenders are brought
before the adult court rather than the juvenile court. However, we take advantage of
information on criminal convictions prior to age 18 in predicting the likelihood of
imprisonment from that age forward.
4 While the penal regime in The Netherlands has become harsher over the years, still more than 80% of the
unsuspended custodial sanctions imposed in 2007 (the most recent figure available from Statistics
Netherland) were shorter than 12 months. Similar percentages have been reported in many other European
countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (see Aebi
et al. 2006).
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Empirical Methods
Our interest in this study is in the effect of first-time incarceration on the likelihood of
marriage and divorce. We investigate the likelihood of marriage among individuals who
were unmarried in the year they entered prison, and the likelihood of divorce among
individuals who were married in the year they entered prison. In each case, the follow-up
window includes the one, three, and five calendar years following incarceration. As a point
of departure in describing our statistical methodology, we employ the language of program
evaluation in which we are interested in estimating a ‘‘treatment effect’’ of incarceration on
marriage and divorce.5 A ‘‘treated’’ individual in our study is one who is sentenced to a
spell of incarceration of any length for the first time at a given age, while an ‘‘untreated’’
individual is one who is observationally equivalent, does not have a history of imprison-
ment, and who was convicted but not imprisoned at the same age his ‘‘treated’’ counterpart
was incarcerated.
Propensity Score Estimation
In order to model non-random selection into treatment, we employ the method of
propensity score matching, and in particular the technique known as risk set matching.
Rooted in the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984, 1985), a propensity score is
defined as ‘‘the conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a
vector of observed covariates’’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, p. 41). It is equivalent to
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Fig. 1 Age of first incarceration in a Dutch conviction cohort. Note: The figure includes the 2,335 men who
were ever incarcerated up to 2003. Source: Criminal Career and Life-Course Study (CCLS)
5 In the present context, ‘‘treatment’’ is generically taken to mean any intentional intervention. It is not to be
confused with participation in a correctional rehabilitation program.
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propensity score, is the same for imprisoned and non-imprisoned individuals.6 The
essence of covariate balance lies in the fact that, given the propensity score and
suitable matches, the covariates are of no further use in predicting which of two
matched individuals is imprisoned. As a result, there is no systematic tendency for the
two matched individuals to be different on the basis of observables. In this analysis, the
propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of imprisonment at a spe-
cific age, given current conviction for a criminal offense and no previous incarceration
spell.
Risk set matching is a generalization of propensity score matching that allows the
estimated propensity score to be age-dependent (Li et al. 2001).7 Specifically, the usual
propensity score is substituted by the hazard (measured in discrete time) of incarceration at
age t for each individual:
hiðtÞ ¼ Pr Ti ¼ tjTi  tð Þ
The hazard represents the probability that individual i experiences incarceration at time
(age) t given no prior incarceration experience, where Ti signifies the individual’s event
time. The cumulative logistic function is then used to model the hazard of first-time





¼ at þ bwi þ dxit
where wi includes time-invariant covariates measured prior to age 18, xit includes
time-varying covariates measured up to age t, and at represent age-specific constants.
Individual event times are censored either because of death or post-2003 calendar
year.
For clarity, note that the method used here entails matching an individual who was
incarcerated at age t with an observationally similar individual who was not incar-
cerated at age t but was ‘‘at risk’’ of being incarcerated at age t (Li et al. 2001).
Therefore, an individual is in the risk set only if he was at least convicted of a crime at
age t, simply because a non-convicted individual is not truly at risk of incarceration.
Moreover, because matching takes place on past and current rather than future
observables, an individual who was incarcerated at age t is matched to an individual
who was not yet incarcerated by age t, as opposed to an individual who was never
incarcerated (Li et al. 2001). Thus we avoid using future information to determine
6 Propensity score matching is similar to standard regression in that it is assumed in both cases that selection
into treatment is random conditional on observed characteristics. However, propensity score matching
differs from regression in at least two key ways. First, it does not rely on a linear functional form to estimate
treatment effects. Although the propensity score is estimated using a parametric model, once obtained,
individuals are matched non-parametrically. Second, propensity score matching highlights the issue of
common support by revealing the degree to which untreated cases resemble the treated cases on observed
characteristics. Standard regression (a.k.a. covariate adjustment), on the other hand, obscures this issue and
risks extrapolating treatment effect estimates based solely on functional form when treated and untreated
groups are actually incomparable. In many applications, only a subset of the untreated population (and
perhaps the treated population as well) will be useful for estimating treatment effects. For recent empirical
work employing propensity score matching, see Morgan (2001) and Harding (2003).
7 Risk set matching is only one technique that allows the propensity score to vary as a function of age- or
time-dependent covariates, a recent application of which is provided by Lu (2005). A similar goal is
achieved by inverse probability-of-treatment weighting (IPTW), which is in the class of marginal structural
models discussed by Robins (1999) and Robins et al. (2000). For a recent application of this approach, see
Sampson et al. (2006).
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eligibility for the pool of potential matched, non-imprisoned subjects.8 This also means
that an individual who is not incarcerated at age t could very well be incarcerated at
some later age t0 [ t. In short, untreated in this study should be taken to mean not yet
treated rather than never treated.
A key element in the success of the matching procedure in warding off possible
selection effects is that the propensity score model includes those predictors of treatment
most likely to confound the outcome of interest (Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Heckman et al.
1998). From sentencing research we know that characteristics of the instant offense, the
criminal history of the offender, and his personal characteristics and life circumstances
play an important role in judges’ decisions (Johnson 2006). These predictors also feature
prominently in actuarial risk assessment tools assessing offender dangerousness, thereby
further evidencing their salience when thinking about community protection, one of the
focal concerns of sentencing (see Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000). We use a variety of
these measures to model the propensity score of first-time incarceration conditional on
conviction.
Furthermore, our decision to restrict attention to individuals who are at least convicted
of a crime at age t is intended to balance a wide variety of unobserved variables that might
constitute ‘‘extralegal’’ factors in criminal justice processing. To the degree that latter
stages of processing afford criminal justice officials less discretion in the determination of
offender dispositions, concern over biased estimates of the effect of incarceration is mit-
igated. Nevertheless, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to ascertain how much bias from
unobservables would be necessary to undermine our treatment effect estimates.
Matching Protocol and Treatment Effect Estimation
With the hazard of imprisonment in hand, we match each incarcerated individual with his
same-aged, nearest neighbor, with replacement and within a caliper set to 0.001.9 Esti-
mation of the average treatment effect (ATE) of incarceration then proceeds in a
straightforward manner. The treatment effect for each imprisoned individual is his post-
release outcome less the mean outcome for his matched, non-imprisoned counterpart. The
sample ATE at each post-incarceration age is then recovered by taking the expectation over
each of the i = 1,…,N incarcerated subjects and his matched, non-incarcerated counterpart
indexed by i,j:
8 The underlying rationale for this approach is well argued by Li et al. (2001) in their hypothetical example
of a clinical trial:
Imagine a strict rule that assigned patients to treatment whenever their symptoms became acute. In
this hypothetical case, to know that a patient never received treatment is to know that the patient had
a relatively favorable outcome. If the control group consisted of all patients who never received
treatment, then it would contain only patients with favorable outcomes, because any patient whose
symptoms later became acute received the treatment. (Li et al., 2001, p. 871)
Simply put, untreated subjects in this hypothetical scenario were never truly at risk of being treated. In the
language of program evaluation, treatment is not independent of potential outcomes. Such an after-the-fact
selection rule would obviously introduce extreme biases into any treatment effect estimates.
9 We employed a wide range of matching protocols and achieved results that were substantially similar. The
results we display are from 1-to-1 matching with replacement and a caliper of 0.001. In sensitivity analyses,
we matched each treated individual with one, three, and five nearest neighbors within calipers of 0.05, 0.01,
and 0.001.
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In fact, this quantity represents the average treatment effect on the treated. The outcome
y (subscripted by i or i,j depending on whether the indexed subject is treated or untreated)
is one of two binary indicators: An indicator for marriage conditional on being unmarried
at the time of treatment, and an indicator for divorce conditional on being married at the
time of treatment. In order to take into account sampling variability, the variance of the





where si and si,j are the sample standard deviations of yi and yi,j, respectively. For the
purpose of statistical inference, the standard error is obtained by taking the square root of
the variance.
To provide some sense of the substantive (in addition to statistical) significance of the
impact of imprisonment, we provide an estimate of the standardized difference as
described by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).10 This quantity is equivalent to and serves the
same function as Cohen’s d (Cohen 1988), a common measure of effect size. Our estimate
of the standardized difference, or what we refer to below as the effect size (ES), is
calculated:




The means are indexed by i and i,j, signifying the mean of y for incarcerated individuals
less the mean for their matched, non-incarcerated counterparts—the average treatment
effect (ATE). However, in the denominator, the standard deviations are indexed by i and j,
denoting the standard deviation of y for incarcerated individuals and the standard deviation
of y for all non-incarcerated individuals, whether they are matched or not. The effect size
serves as a supplement to our tests for statistical significance when low statistical power is
a consideration. Following convention (Cohen 1988; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985), the rule
of thumb that we use to judge whether an average treatment effect is substantively
meaningful is |ES| C 0.20.
Results
As a point of departure, Fig. 2 illustrates cumulative and contemporaneous marriage
probabilities in the CCLS among all men with no prison record until 2003 compared to
men with at least one incarceration spell. Inspection of the cumulative probability of
marriage shows a gap in the likelihood of ever being married that is a function of
imprisonment as well as age. Although incarcerated men are somewhat more precocious in
the transition to marriage until the early-20s, a gap in the likelihood of marriage emerges
10 As the formula shows, the standardized difference provides an estimate of the mean difference as a
proportion of the average standard deviation. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) proposed using the standardized
difference to judge covariate balance before and after matching on the propensity score, which we do in the
appendix. However, the measure also has utility for estimating an effect size for the average treatment
effect.
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from the mid-20s onward, which happens to correspond with the mean age of first
imprisonment (23.4 years). This gap appears to narrow with age, however, and to stabilize
at about five percentage points.
Differences in the probability of currently being married are far more notable than
differences in the probability of having ever been married. By age 30 and later, about 40%
of ever-imprisoned men are currently married, a figure that remains stable at least until the
mid-60s. Among never-imprisoned men, on the other hand, the corresponding figure is
about 66%. This means that ever-imprisoned men have a current marriage likelihood that is
about 39% lower than never-imprisoned men. Recall that all of the men in the CCLS are
convicted at some point (in 1977, at a minimum), so the sample can be considered high
risk. Thus the difference is surprisingly large considering that we have a ‘‘homogeneous’’
sample.
Fig. 2 thus provides prima facie evidence for the disruptive impact of incarceration on
marriage. However, its effect on existing marriages (via divorce) seems far more salient,
and there is less compelling evidence for long-term reductions in the likelihood of a
transition to marriage. In fact, imprisonment would appear to have a predominantly in-
capacitative effect on transitions to marriage, as indicated by the wider gap in cumulative
marriage probabilities in the 30s and 40s (the prison-prone years), but with only a small
permanent reduction that persists into later life on the order of about 5%. However, it is
unclear whether these observed differences can be plausibly attributed to the causal effect
of imprisonment or to the differential selection of imprisoned offenders into non-marriage
and, in particular, unstable marital situations.
Risk Set Matching Model of First-Time Imprisonment
As a first step toward causal inference, we estimate a propensity score of incarceration.



























Fig. 2 Current and cumulative marriage probabilities, by imprisonment status. Note: The figure reports on
the 1,856 men who were never incarcerated up to 2003 and the 2,335 men who were ever incarcerated.
Source: Criminal Career and Life-Course Study (CCLS)
J Quant Criminol (2010) 26:269–300 281
123
Table 1 Discrete-time hazard model of first-time imprisonment conditional on conviction
Mean (SD) Bivariate coefficients Multivariate coefficients
b (SE) exp(b) b (SE) exp(b)
Instant offense
Category of offense
Simple theft (ref.) 15.3% – –
Rape 1.7% 1.993 (0.238)*** 7.34 2.413 (0.256)*** 11.17
Sexual assault 2.0% 0.983 (0.217)*** 2.67 1.275 (0.235)*** 3.58
Sexual abuses/other sexual
offense
3.1% 0.555 (0.190)** 1.74 0.664 (0.205)** 1.94
Threatening 2.4% 0.873 (0.204)*** 2.39 0.961 (0.226)*** 2.61
(Attempted) murder/
manslaughter
1.1% 1.118 (0.282)*** 3.06 1.371 (0.327)*** 3.94
Assault 16.3% 0.362 (0.116)** 1.44 0.386 (0.126)** 1.47
Violent theft 1.9% 2.327 (0.241)*** 10.25 2.469 (0.262)*** 11.82
Extortion 0.6% 2.180 (0.408)*** 8.85 2.277 (0.445)*** 9.75
Forgery 2.4% 0.060 (0.231) 1.06 0.084 (0.271) 1.09
Aggravated assault 23.6% 0.839 (0.105)*** 2.31 0.793 (0.115)*** 2.21
Embezzlement 1.8% 0.038 (0.267) 1.04 -0.087 (0.286) 0.92
Swindling 0.8% 0.064 (0.387) 1.07 0.006 (0.417) 1.01
Fencing 3.6% -0.074 (0.203) 0.93 -0.040 (0.216) 0.96
Public order 3.2% -0.098 (0.212) 0.91 0.107 (0.224) 1.11
General offending 0.6% 1.007 (0.374)** 2.74 1.321 (0.398)*** 3.75
Offense against authority 2.3% -0.719 (0.297)* 0.49 -0.566 (0.309) 0.57
Flashing 4.1% -1.592 (0.321)*** 0.20 -1.540 (0.339)*** 0.21
Vandalism 6.1% -1.225 (0.233)*** 0.29 -1.045 (0.241)*** 0.35
Other criminal law 1.1% -0.990 (0.477)* 0.37 -1.266 (0.508)* 0.28
Opium act 4.1% 0.377 (0.175)* 1.46 0.556 (0.192)** 1.74
Weapons act 2.1% 0.210 (0.238) 1.23 0.681 (0.253)** 1.98
Severity of offense 0.017 (1.38) 0.189 (0.024)*** 1.21 0.210 (0.027)*** 1.23
No. crimes in case of conviction
Violent crimes 0.020 (0.16) 0.983 (0.188)*** 2.67 0.493 (0.203)* 1.64
Property crimes 0.090 (0.36) 1.141 (0.090)*** 3.13 0.905 (0.098)*** 2.47
Other crimes 0.064 (0.28) 0.547 (0.102)*** 1.73 0.667 (0.117)*** 1.95
Criminal history
No. crimes in past 5 years
Violent crimes 0.192 (0.51) 0.060 (0.059)*** 1.06 0.012 (0.069) 1.01
Property crimes 0.668 (1.18) 0.249 (0.025)*** 1.28 0.237 (0.031)*** 1.27
Other crimes 0.313 (0.75) 0.021 (0.040) 1.02 0.144 (0.050)** 1.15
No. crimes beyond past 5 years
Violent crimes 0.125 (0.50) -0.381 (0.085)*** 0.68 -0.164 (0.098) 0.99
Property crimes 0.374 (0.97) -0.125 (0.036)*** 0.88 -0.009 (0.048) 0.85
Other crimes 0.147 (0.57) -0.320 (0.073)*** 0.73 0.086 (0.079) 1.09
Early conviction (before age 16) 24.4% 0.228 (0.070)*** 1.25 0.074 (0.092) 1.08
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imprisonment at age t. These are logistic coefficients that, when logged, represent hazard
ratios.11 The model is based on 5,264 person-periods for 2,790 male offenders convicted
between the ages of 18 and 38. Recall that our strategy entails conditioning on conviction
at each age. The coefficients thus represent the predictive influence of the listed charac-
teristics on first-time imprisonment risk given that an individual has been convicted and is
therefore at risk of confinement.12
The results in Table 1 are closely aligned with existing research on the factors that
influence the receipt of custodial sentences. Collectively, the most salient determinants of
incarceration are official characteristics that summarize the severity of the current offense
and the offender’s recent criminal history. The first set of predictors describes the
Table 1 continued
Mean (SD) Bivariate coefficients Multivariate coefficients
b (SE) exp(b) b (SE) exp(b)
Life circumstances




Not married—children 2.9% -0.061 (0.182) 0.94 0.318 (0.254) 1.37
Married—no children 6.4% -0.690 (0.147)*** 0.50 -0.424 (0.189)* 0.65
Married—children 16.9% -0.299 (0.086)*** 0.74 0.160 (0.191) 1.17
Separated—no children 1.1% -0.475 (0.327) 0.62 -0.023 (0.392) 0.98
Separated—children 3.4% -0.101 (0.170) 0.90 0.372 (0.262) 1.45
Marital and fertility history
No. years married in past
5 years
86.0% -0.094 (0.020)*** 0.91 -0.025 (0.052) 0.97
No. years have children in
past 5 years
78.6% -0.062 (0.019)*** 0.94 -0.005 (0.051) 0.99
Sociodemographics
Non-Dutch 12.8% 0.647 (0.085)*** 1.91 0.606 (0.101)*** 1.83
Birth cohort
Cohort 1 36.7% -0.464 (0.084)*** 0.63 -1.616 (0.114)*** 0.20
Cohort 2 42.7% -0.199 (0.079)* 0.82 -0.897 (0.097)*** 0.41
Cohort 3 (ref.) 20.6% – –
N = 2,790; NT = 5,264. The age dummies and a constant are suppressed to conserve space
 p \ .10, * p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001 (two-tailed tests)
11 The transformation, exp(b) - 1, provides the proportional increase/decrease in the hazard of impris-
onment given a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable, evaluated at the means of the remaining
covariates.
12 Note that the hazard model is estimated for the entire eligible sample (i.e., individuals convicted at age t
with no previous incarceration spell), including those who are married as well as unmarried at the time of
their conviction/incarceration. We control for marital status at the time of conviction in the model. We pool
both samples together in the propensity score model because there is no reason to believe that the incar-
ceration mechanism differs qualitatively for married and unmarried men. Then, in order to estimate the
average treatment effect (ATE) of incarceration, we stratify the sample directly by the offender’s marital
status. The strategy of estimation within subpopulations defined by the covariates has precedence in the
literature on the propensity score methodology (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984).
J Quant Criminol (2010) 26:269–300 283
123
characteristics of the ‘‘instant offense,’’ or the offense(s) for which an individual is con-
victed at age t. For each conviction the underlying section of the criminal code was used to
distinguish between types of offenses, and in offenses leading to multiple convictions, the
offense type was top-coded. Offenses of rape, violent theft, and extortion carry a far higher
odds (hazard) of imprisonment than simple theft (the reference offense), followed by
sexual assault, (attempted) homicide,13 and ‘‘general offending.’’ The lowest imprisonment
risk is observed for individuals convicted of such offenses as flashing, vandalism, and
‘‘other criminal law’’ offenses. A continuous measure of offense severity—representing the
maximum penalty prescribed in the penal code—is positively and significantly associated
with incarceration, as would be expected. Continuous measures of the number of crimes
underlying the current conviction also have positive coefficients, indicating that criminal
cases with multiple offenses (i.e., ‘‘multiple counts’’) are significantly more likely to result
in imprisonment.
The second set of characteristics summarizes the criminal history of the offender. These
include the number of convictions in the 5 years prior to the current conviction as well as
the number of convictions in the remainder of the criminal career beyond those 5 years. As
shown, individuals with a more extensive criminal history are more likely to be incar-
cerated, particularly if a criminal history has been accumulated in the past 5 years. Con-
victions beyond this period are largely unrelated to imprisonment risk. A dichotomous
indicator of conviction prior to age 16 is unrelated to incarceration once other criminal
history measures are controlled.
The final set of predictors summarizes the life circumstances and sociodemographic
characteristics of the offenders. Although life circumstances are largely unrelated to
confinement in the multivariate model, the non-Dutch are significantly more likely to be
incarcerated net of legally relevant factors. Additionally, there are period effects as indi-
cated by the birth cohort indicators, signifying greater punitiveness over time in The
Netherlands. Although age dummies are not shown in Table 1, the hazard of imprisonment
rises and then falls as individuals age, with the peak hazard observed at ages 19–22.14
Effect of First-Time Imprisonment on the Likelihood of Marriage
Table 2 provides estimates of the effect of incarceration on the likelihood of marriage
among men who were not married in the year of conviction. In order to ascertain how (if)
the effect of imprisonment on the likelihood of marriage unfolds over time, we provide
treatment effect estimates for 1, 3, and 5 years following first-time imprisonment. The first
row of coefficients compares marriage probabilities of imprisoned men with all non-
imprisoned men in the CCLS. In all three time periods, the difference is statistically
significant and grows by about 1.5 probability points every 2 years. When age dummies are
controlled (the second row of coefficients), the differences remain statistically significant.
Although statistically significant, however, the magnitude of these differences are quite
small as indicated by the effect size estimates—at maximum 0.10, or 10% of the sample
standard deviation, which is not noteworthy by any conventional standard.
13 Note that most of the offenses labeled as attempted manslaughter in The Netherlands would be classified
as assaults in the US.
14 Comparing the covariates listed in Table 1 for the treated and untreated before and after conditioning on
the propensity score shows that, before matching, there is imbalance on a number of covariates. In par-
ticular, using mean comparisons (t-tests) about half of the covariates are imbalanced, while using effect sizes
about one-quarter are imbalanced. After matching, however, there is (almost) complete balance. Details on
covariate balance are provided in the appendix.
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The results when using all non-imprisoned men as a comparison sample harmonizes
with existing research on the effect of incarceration on marriage. However, the problem of
stochastic selectivity (a kind of selection bias) complicates interpretation of the observed
marriage differences as causal. Therefore, the second set of coefficients compares marriage
probabilities of imprisoned men with all non-imprisoned men who were also convicted.
Thus, the counterfactual marriage probability is derived from a high-risk sample of men
who were filtered almost as far through the criminal justice system as the imprisoned men.
Interestingly, conditioning the sample on conviction in this way reduces all treatment
effects to statistical and substantive non-significance.
The final set of coefficients matches each imprisoned (treated) offender with a same-
aged convicted (untreated) counterpart, thereby choosing from among an already high-
risk comparison sample only those who most closely resemble the imprisoned individuals
on the observable characteristics shown in Table 1. Only 84.7% of the imprisoned men
have valid matches, or in propensity score (risk set) matching parlance, are ‘‘on sup-
port.’’15 One year post-incarceration, the treatment effect is 2.06 probability points but
fails to achieve statistical significance (p \ .140). A logistic regression of 1-year mar-
riage on incarceration produces an odds ratio of 0.698 (b = -0.360), which implies a
30.2-percent drop in the odds of marriage (0.698–1 = -0.302) 1 year following first-
time imprisonment (p \ .119). In subsequent time periods, however, the treatment effect
is so miniscule as to be indistinguishable from zero. Thus, the strongest evidence for an
impact of incarceration on marriage is the first year post-imprisonment. Yet even this
evidence is weak, as judged by the lack of statistical significance and the small effect
size (-0.09).
Table 2 Average treatment effect of imprisonment on post-release marriage probabilities






ATE (SE) ES ATE (SE) ES ATE (SE) ES
Unmatched, all men
Unadjusted -.0194 (.0064)** -.08 -.0343 (.0112)** -.09 -.0474 (.0136)*** -.10
Age adjusted -.0183 (.0065)** -.08 -.0427 (.0111)*** -.11 -.0706 (.0134)*** -.16
Unmatched, convicted men
Unadjusted -.0047 (.0076) -.02 -.0035 (.0126) -.01 .0003 (.0150) ?.00
Age adjusted -.0061 (.0076) -.03 .0001 (.0127) ?.00 -.0084 (.0151) -.02
Nearest neighbor matching -.0206 (.0140) -.09 -.0038 (.0218) -.01 -.0093 (.0269) -.02
Point estimates represent the average treatment effect on the treated, with cluster-robust standard errors in
parentheses. Nearest neighbor matching is 1-to-1 with replacement and within a 0.001-caliper
ATE average treatment effect (on the treated), ES effect size or standardized difference (Cohen’s d)
 p \ .10, * p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001 (two-tailed tests)
15 Imprisoned men for whom we were unsuccessful in identifying suitable matches tended to be convicted
of comparatively more serious offenses and to have a more extensive criminal history. For example, they
were more likely to be convicted of rape or violent theft, to have more crimes involved in their conviction
offense, and to have more prior property convictions.
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Effect of First-Time Imprisonment on the Likelihood of Divorce
Table 3 provides estimates of the effect of incarceration on the likelihood of divorce
among men who were married in the year of conviction. As before, we provide 1-, 3-, and
5-year divorce probability differences. The first set of coefficients treats the divorce
likelihood of all non-imprisoned men (whether they are convicted at age t or not) as the
counterfactual outcome. These results reveal a substantial impact of imprisonment on
divorce in all time periods following release, which is only modestly attenuated when age
dummies are controlled. Moreover, the impact grows considerably as time elapses. For
example, by the fifth year following release, imprisoned men have a divorce probability
that is an astonishing 20.21 points higher than non-imprisoned men.
The second set of coefficients includes only men who were convicted of a crime in the
comparison sample. Doing so reduces the magnitude of the treatment effects by half,
although they still achieve statistical significance in post-release years three and five, and
the effect is still substantively meaningful in the fifth post-imprisonment year, with an
effect size of 0.21. Direct adjustment for age does little to change the substantive findings.
In the final set of results, the treatment effects after matching each imprisoned indi-
vidual with his same-aged nearest neighbor are shown. In this analysis, only 64.0% of
imprisoned individuals have valid matches and thus contribute to the estimate of the
treatment effects.16 The differences in divorce probabilities are 0.0568, 0.1036, and 0.1390
after 1, 3, and 5 years following imprisonment, respectively. Not only are these results
statistically significant (or at least marginally so 1 year post-incarceration), the effects sizes
all exceed 0.20, which we interpret as noteworthy. Additionally, a logistic regression of the
likelihood of divorce after 5 years produces an odds ratio of 2.096 (b = 0.740), which
implies a full doubling of the odds of divorce that is attributable to incarceration
(p \ .009).
Table 3 Average Treatment Effect of Imprisonment on Post-Release Divorce Probabilities






ATE (SE) ES ATE (SE) ES ATE (SE) ES
Unmatched, all men
Unadjusted .0629 (.0170)*** ?.28 .1324 (.0243)*** ?.39 .2021 (.0282)*** ?.50
Age adjusted .0618 (.0172)*** ?.27 .1235 (.0244)*** ?.36 .1824 (.0279)*** ?.45
Unmatched, convicted men
Unadjusted .0285 (.0187) ?.11 .0540 (.0270)* ?.14 .0922 (.0312)** ?.21
Age adjusted .0369 (.0194) ?.14 .0533 (.0279)* ?.14 .0821 (.0318)** ?.18
Nearest neighbor matching .0568 (.0291) ?.22 .1036 (.0411)* ?.27 .1390 (.0501)** ?.31
Point estimates represent the average treatment effect on the treated, with cluster-robust standard errors in
parentheses. Nearest neighbor matching is 1-to-1 with replacement and within a 0.001-caliper
ATE average treatment effect (on the treated), ES effect size or standardized difference (Cohen’s d)
 p \ .10, * p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001 (two-tailed tests)
16 The imprisoned men who were off support were more likely to be convicted of violent offenses (e.g.,
rape, violent theft, aggravated assault) and less likely to be convicted of property offenses (e.g., theft,
forgery, weapons act), had a higher offense severity score and more extensive criminal histories, and were
convicted for the first time prior to age 16. They were also more likely to be ethnic minorities.
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Subgroup Estimates of the Impact of Incarceration
Having estimated the overall impact of first-time incarceration on marriage formation and
stability, we proceed with subgroup analyses along a number of measurable dimensions. For
ease of presentation, we limit our attention to the 5-year effects of incarceration. One per-
tinent question is the degree to which the impact of incarceration varies by the age at which an
individual is imprisoned for the first time. To test this possibility, we first created an inter-
action term representing the product of the offender’s age with the imprisonment indicator.
We also conducted nearest neighbor matching within 2-year age intervals and estimated age-
specific treatment effects. In all instances, however, there was no discernible pattern.17
Second, we created interaction terms between the imprisonment indicator and several of
the life circumstances, sociodemographic indicators, and offense characteristics. Most of
the tests for interactions failed to reveal different effects of imprisonment status on the
likelihood of marriage and divorce (e.g., length of marriage, ethnicity), although we
acknowledge that statistical power was potentially compromised in many of these tests.
However, there were several notable findings in the models for divorce. Men who were
married with children were far less likely to get divorced as a result of imprisonment than
married men without children (the interaction term is significant at two-tailed p \ .001).
For example, the probability of divorce among imprisoned men with children is 0.27,
compared to 0.51 among imprisoned men with no children.18
Divorce risk is also higher among men imprisoned for more serious offenses, as indi-
cated by an interaction term between imprisonment and our continuous measure of offense
severity (significant at two-tailed p \ .047). Although offense severity exerts no influence
on divorce among men who are only convicted for a crime, imprisonment for a more
serious offense leads to higher divorce risk compared to imprisonment for a less serious
offense.
Sensitivity of the Average Treatment Effects to Hidden Bias
Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the propensity score estimates of the effect of
first-time imprisonment. This analysis proceeds along the lines recommended by Rosen-
baum (2002). If the probability that an individual receives treatment is a function of the
observed covariates and the observed covariates alone, then a study is free of hidden bias.
However, Rosenbaum observes: ‘‘There is hidden bias if two units with the same observed
covariates x have differing chances of receiving the treatment’’ (Rosenbaum 2002, p. 106,
emphasis in original). This is to say that, if the propensity score model employed in this
analysis is not entirely successful in capturing selection into the treatment, the estimated
treatment effects may still be compromised. We therefore evaluate the sensitivity of the
average treatment effect to a range of assumptions concerning the presence and magnitude
of unobserved confounding.19 Details on the procedure we use are provided in an attached
appendix. To economize the presentation of results, we limit our attention to the 5-year
effects. By way of review, the average treatment effect on marriage is –0.0093 (p \ .728)
17 Results are not shown but are available upon request.
18 Interestingly, the effect of children appears to be opposite (but not quite marginally so) for convicted but
non-imprisoned men: Convicted men with children have a divorce probability of 0.21 compared to 0.11
among convicted men without children (p \ .107).
19 To conduct the analysis, we invoke the user-written Stata routine—mhbounds—developed by Becker and
Caliendo (2007).
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from Table 2, and the average treatment effect on divorce is 0.1390 (p \ .006) from
Table 3. The sensitivity analysis is based on Mantel and Haenzel’s (1959) test statistic, Q,
for binary outcomes (see also Aakvik 2001; Becker and Caliendo 2007).
The results of the estimation of ‘‘Rosenbaum bounds’’ on the effect of incarceration are
displayed in Table 4. The first row of coefficients provides test statistics and corresponding
p-values for C = 1.0, which is equivalent to the scenario of no hidden bias. These esti-
mates replicate the substantive and statistical findings from Tables 2 and 3. Specifically,
imprisonment has no effect on the likelihood of marriage (Q = -0.23, two-tailed
p \ .814) and increases the likelihood of divorce (Q = 2.72, two-tailed p \ .006). The
coefficients in the remaining rows evaluate the sensitivity of these effects (or their absence)
to the degree to which they may be overestimated or underestimated because of unob-
served confounding. For example, a value of C = 1.2 represents a scenario assuming that
hidden bias would increase the odds of imprisonment for a treated individual compared to
an untreated individual by an additional 20%, over and above the estimated propensity
score. If we believe that positive self-selection exists despite conditioning on the estimated
propensity score, then the coefficients and p-values under the Q? column are appropriate.
On the other hand, if we believe that negative self-selection exists, then the coefficients and
p-values under the Q- column are appropriate.20
Table 4 Sensitivity of 5-year treatment effect estimates to hidden bias
Gamma (C) Effect of incarceration on marriage Effect of incarceration on divorce
Q? (p-value) Q- (p-value) Q? (p-value) Q- (p-value)
1.00 -0.23 (.407) -0.23 (.407) ?2.72 (.003) ?2.72 (.003)
1.05 -0.66 (.254) -0.08 (.469) ?2.54 (.006) ?2.92 (.002)
1.10 -1.07 (.143) ?0.48 (.314) ?2.36 (.009) ?3.10 (.001)
1.15 -1.46 (.073) ?0.87 (.192) ?2.19 (.014) ?3.27 (.001)
1.20 -1.83 (.034) ?1.24 (.107) ?2.03 (.021) ?3.44 (.000)
1.25 -2.19 (.014) ?1.60 (.055) ?1.87 (.031) ?3.60 (.000)
1.30 -2.53 (.006) ?1.94 (.026) ?1.72 (.042) ?3.75 (.000)
1.35 -2.86 (.002) ?2.28 (.011) ?1.58 (.057) ?3.90 (.000)
1.40 -3.18 (.001) ?2.59 (.005) ?1.44 (.075) ?4.04 (.000)
1.45 -3.49 (.000) ?2.90 (.002) ?1.31 (.095) ?4.18 (.000)
1.50 -3.79 (.000) ?3.20 (.001) ?1.18 (.119) ?4.32 (.000)
C signifies the odds ratio for the effect of unobservables on the likelihood of imprisonment for individuals
who were actually imprisoned versus individuals who were not imprisoned. Refer to the appendix for
details. Q represents Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic, which is distributed as a standard normal
random variable (i.e., it is a z-test). Q? signifies the simulated test statistic under the assumption that the
treatment effect is overestimated (i.e., the propensity score matching estimate is biased by positive self-
selection), while Q- signifies the simulated test statistic under the assumption that the treatment effect is
underestimated (i.e., the propensity score matching estimate is biased by negative self-selection). One-tailed
p-values are provided for each statistic
20 It important to emphasize that this sensitivity analysis generates ‘‘worst case’’ bounds on estimated
treatment effects. That is, even small values of C that result in non-significance of a treatment effect do not
invalidate the original estimates. DiPrete and Gangl (2004) explain that non-significance simply means that
confidence intervals for the impact of incarceration would include zero if an unobserved variable was
responsible for a difference in the odds of treatment assignment between imprisoned and non-imprisoned
individuals, and ‘‘if this variable’s effect on [marriage or divorce] was so strong as to almost perfectly
determine whether [the likelihood of marriage or divorce] would be bigger [or smaller] for the treatment or
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In order to estimate an inverse relationship between incarceration and marriage that is at
least marginally significant, positive self-selection on the order of C = 1.20 and larger
would be required. In other words, if there is reason to believe that, net of the propensity
score (and the covariates that comprise it), imprisoned individuals are still more likely to
be married for reasons that have nothing to do with their incarceration experience, then the
estimated effect of incarceration on marriage would be negative. Although such positive
self-selection seems counterintuitive, recall from Fig. 2 that, at least into their 20s, men
with a history of incarceration are actually more likely to be married. This gives support to
the possibility that unobserved self-selection, if present, is positive and may be upwardly
biasing our estimate of the impact of incarceration on marriage.21
The effect of incarceration on divorce is sensitive to positive self-selection on the order
of C = 1.35 and larger, which would render the estimated effect no longer significant at a
10-percent level. However, if we have reason to believe that our treatment effects are
biased by negative self-selection—that the treatment effect is underestimated—then the
average treatment effect grows with the magnitude of confounding. Considering that
treatment effect estimates in applied research are often sensitive to C as small as 1.15 (e.g.,
Becker and Caliendo 2007), we judge this to be a robust result.
Discussion
In this study, our interest has centered on the impact of first-time imprisonment on the
likelihood of marriage and divorce. Considering the (by now) well-established protective
role that marriage plays in the criminal career (in the male criminal career, at least), as well
as cross-national expansion in the use of incarceration as the predominant form of crime
control, an important social concern is the degree to which widespread use of prison may
actually backfire by worsening the life chances of offenders returning to the community
after they have paid their debt to society (Hagan and Dinovitzer 1999). If imprisoned
offenders suffer deficits in the marriage market following their confinement (among other
markets, most notably the labor market), then one potent avenue for the adoption of a more
conventional, law-abiding lifestyle is denied them. Their exclusion from such institutional
participation could lead to a delay in the desistance process and thus to prolonged criminal
involvement.
To estimate the presence and magnitude of these effects, we utilized data from a long-
term study of a cohort of Dutch offenders convicted of a criminal offense in 1977. We
employed the technique of risk set matching, which involved identifying at least one
convicted offender who was not imprisoned but was at equally high risk of imprisonment.
These data and methods have several advantages for a study of the impact of imprisonment
on marriage and divorce. First, we are uniquely situated to conduct a long-term follow-up
(up to 5 years, in our application) to ascertain how the effect of first-time incarceration
Footnote 20 continued
the control case in each pair of matched cases in the data’’ (DiPrete and Gangl 2004, p. 291, emphasis
removed). They explain further that, in instances where unobserved confounding strongly affects treatment
assignment but only weakly influences the response variable, the estimated confidence intervals would not
include zero. We would add further that, if the unobserved variable is not binary, then the Rosenbaum
bounds are again too wide for a given value of C.
21 If we instead estimate Rosenbaum bounds on the 1-year marriage likelihood, we find that positive self-
selection on the order of C = 1.05 pushes the incarceration effect on marriage to 10-percent significance,
while C = 1.15 pushes it to 5-percent significance.
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unfolds over time. We can thus examine whether the impact of incarceration is immediate
or delayed, and whether it decays or grows with the passage of time. Second, we avoid
comparing the marriage and divorce likelihoods of imprisoned offenders to ‘‘everyone
else,’’ which is the convention in all of the existing studies. We instead restrict our
attention to individuals who have at least been convicted at the same age, which on its face
provides a stronger counterfactual source because of the known stochastic selectivity of
higher-risk individuals into later stages of the criminal justice system (Blumstein et al.
1993). Third, the use of risk set matching ensures that we select from this comparison
sample only those convicted individuals who themselves have a high risk of being
incarcerated, as determined by a number of official and unofficial characteristics known
from sentencing research to predict custodial sanctions.
The results demonstrate a short-lived, but quite modest, impact of confinement on the
probability of marriage. But we note that ours is a generous interpretation, as the effect is
not statistically significant and can only be judged as ‘‘small’’ in terms of its effect size.
Nevertheless, this interpretation is consistent with a number of other studies demonstrating
an inverse incarceration-marriage link that exists either contemporaneously or in the very
short term (Huebner 2005, 2007; Lopoo and Western 2005; Sampson et al. 2006; Western
2006; Western et al. 2004; Western and McLanahan 2000). By the time that 3 years have
elapsed, however, the differences in marriage attributable to incarceration are no longer
discernible when imprisoned offenders are matched with similarly high-risk convicted
men. This finding conflicts with other studies that observe long-term effects (Huebner
2005, 2007; Lopoo and Western 2005; Raphael 2007; Sampson and Laub 1993; Sampson
et al. 2006).
In our data, then, imprisoned offenders suffer no long-term deterioration in their mar-
riage prospects, at least compared to convicted individuals that look similar to them. This
leads us to conclude that the short-term impact of incarceration on marriage, to the extent
there is one, reflects nothing more than a residual incapacitation effect—imprisonment
temporarily delays nuptials but does not permanently disrupt them. Simply put, imprisoned
offenders are temporarily restrained from participation in the marriage market, and
therefore require some time (but no more than 1 year) to ‘‘get back into the game,’’ as it
were. If incarceration stigmatizes offenders or otherwise constrains their opportunities in
the marriage market, we would expect its impact to be felt well beyond the first year after
their return to the community. The fact that we observe no such effect in the risk set
matching model (and in fact, prior to matching, when we only condition on having been
convicted) suggests to us that selection bias is a pernicious problem in existing studies of
incarceration and marriage and that ‘‘everyone else’’ is an inappropriate comparison group
to estimate the impact of incarceration on any outcome. With respect to the likelihood of
marriage, then, our findings support the criminal propensity position that any correlation
between incarceration and marriage is a selection artifact and not the causal effect of
incarceration.
We must also bear in mind an additional possibility, pointed out by an anonymous
reviewer. Incarceration could have a specific deterrent effect on future conviction or
incarceration that might very well cancel out some of the effects observed (or rather, not
observed) on marriage in our analysis. In other words, incarceration might have a direct,
negative effect on the likelihood of marriage that is cancelled out by an indirect, positive
effect through future conviction or future incarceration spells. Assuming that the direct and
indirect effects are of approximately the same magnitude (only differing in sign), the
overall effect of incarceration on marriage would be rendered null. This would happen if
incarceration reduced the likelihood of subsequent conviction/incarceration, and later
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conviction/incarceration reduced the likelihood of marriage. While plausible in theory, a
recent analysis of the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment in these data suggests that it
is an unlikely possibility. Nieuwbeerta et al. (2009) conclude that imprisonment actually
exacerbates criminal conviction. In fact, a recent review of the specific deterrent effect of
imprisonment also suggests that this cancellation is unlikely (Nagin et al. 2009).22 We
evaluated this empirically by adjusting our estimates by conviction and incarceration
during the same 1-, 3-, and 5-year periods that we consider marriage (these results are not
shown). In no instances were the results changed.
In contrast to the findings for marriage, the results indicate quite convincingly that the
effect of incarceration on divorce is statistically significant and substantively meaningful.
This harmonizes with the few existing studies on the incarceration-divorce link (Lopoo and
Western 2005; Western 2006). In our data, by the fifth year post-release, imprisoned men
have a divorce probability that is 56.8% higher than comparable, convicted but non-
imprisoned men. In light of our methodological approach, we are inclined to attribute this
finding to the causal effect of first-time imprisonment on divorce. A sensitivity analysis
(‘‘Rosenbaum bounds’’) additionally demonstrates that unobserved confounding must be
fairly substantial to render the incarceration–divorce relationship non-significant.
We find additional evidence from subgroup analysis that married men without children
and those convicted of serious offenses experience a divorce likelihood that is even higher
than their imprisoned counterparts with children or convicted of minor offenses. In our
data, then, children appear to provide a means for marital stability among imprisoned men.
Children perhaps constitute ‘‘marital-specific capital’’ and therefore increase the gains of
family preservation relative to dissolution (see Becker 1973; Becker et al. 1977). On the
other hand, imprisonment for a serious crime might provide a clear incentive for a spouse
to withdraw from the marriage.23
The implications of these findings are sobering, especially in light of the magnitude of
the effects estimated from our sample. The widespread use of incarceration has the
capacity to cause marital instability from which offenders are unable to recover in the
5-year period following their first incarceration experience. When we investigated whether
subsequent convictions or incarceration spells confounded our estimates of the impact of
incarceration on divorce, we discovered that they did not. The results were thus quite
robust. The precise mechanism for the incarceration effect on divorce is unclear, however,
and unfortunately cannot be parsed out using our data. We can suggest at least three
interrelated possibilities, which point to processes that are external (restrictions imposed by
society), internal (developmental changes within individuals), and transactional (unre-
solved strains between spouses). We consider these to be important avenues for continued
research on the incarceration–divorce relationship.
The first potential mechanism is social exclusion, linked to the stigma of a prison
record. For example, incarcerated offenders might face difficulty finding employment and
therefore helping to provide financial support for their families (Pager 2003; Western
2002). They might also be treated as outcasts by others in their social network (Becker
1963; Braithwaite 1989), which we point out would negatively impact not only the
22 This is not a universal sentiment, however. There remains some evidence that imprisonment can have a
substantial deterrent effect on criminal behavior (e.g., Bhati and Piquero 2008).
23 The underlying causal mechanism is not necessarily attributable to the signal that such confinement sends
about an offender’s risk for domestic violence, however, since the divorce likelihood does not vary by
offense severity among convicted men. It is quite possible that this is an artifact of sentence length. Simply
put, serious offenders serve longer terms of confinement and thus face lengthier time out from marriage,
which can strain marital bonds.
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incarcerated offender but his family as well. The marriage might therefore dissolve as a
result of the strain of one’s status as an ‘‘ex-offender,’’ due to the inability to completely
conceal one’s criminal past from others.
The second possible mechanism is criminal socialization, linked to the prison experi-
ence itself. Exposure to prison might harden inmates and create problems of adjustment to
the outside world (Clemmer 1940), including the family. Or incarcerated offenders might
adopt a criminal self-concept and the repertoire that such a label presupposes (Lemert
1972; Schur 1971), an identity that is not necessarily friendly to strong ‘‘family values.’’
These mechanisms imply that, through the actual experience of incarceration and exposure
to other inmates, offenders become increasingly embedded in crime and a criminal lifestyle
(Hagan 1993). The likelihood of divorce thereby increases because offenders experience
difficulty adapting to life as a conventional, law-abiding citizen.
The third intervening mechanism is marital disruption, linked to the forced separation
between spouses during the period of the offender’s confinement. Western (2006) observes
that imprisonment has a ‘‘corrosive effect on family life’’ (p. 133), not least because
individuals must overcome a number of obstacles to maintain close communication with
their incarcerated spouses (see also Lopoo and Western 2005). The ‘‘surviving spouse’’
might become more independent as a result of the loss of communication and emotional
support. Divorce therefore becomes more likely since the strain of separation erodes the
marital bonds that existed between spouses prior to the offender’s confinement.
As one final discussion point, at the request of one of the co-Editors, we also estimated
the models for 10-year outcomes in order to ascertain if the results observed herein persist
past the 5-year mark. They do indeed. The 10-year marriage probability associated with
incarceration in the nearest neighbor matching model is neither statistically nor practically
significant, and in fact is positive (ATE = .0044; ES = ?.01). The 10-year divorce
probability, on the other hand, was positive, statistically significant, and substantively
meaningful (ATE = .1761; ES = ?.42). Therefore, we observe erosion in marriages
attributable to incarceration that continues to grow over time, for up to 10 years following
first-time imprisonment.
Conclusion
This study adds to the growing research on the detrimental impact of incarceration on life
outcomes, and has implications for life-course/developmental criminology and empirical
tests thereof. The findings indicate that first-time imprisonment among Dutch male
offenders has no causal impact on the likelihood of marriage, other than a residual inca-
pacitation effect in the first year post-confinement. Beyond 1 year, however, any effect of
imprisonment on marriage disappears, at least relative to a sample of convicted individuals
who were at high risk of imprisonment. In the case of transitions to marriage, therefore,
incarceration does not appear to be a salient turning point in the life course of offenders, at
least when incarcerated offenders are properly compared to similarly high-risk men who
were not (yet) incarcerated. Put simply, incarceration does not appear to erode an offen-
der’s ‘‘marriageability,’’ at least to no additional degree beyond the influence of charac-
teristics that determine his risk of conviction.
The same cannot be said of transitions to divorce, however. There is strong evidence
that incarceration has a causal impact on the likelihood of divorce. This effect is
substantively large and grows with the passage of time, persisting for up to 10 years
following first-time imprisonment. In short, among convicted offenders who are already
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married, first-time incarceration represents a substantial, negative turning point in one’s
marriage trajectory. We believe that life-course criminology would greatly benefit by
explicating and testing the mechanism(s) by which incarceration undermines marital
stability.
We should qualify our conclusions by drawing attention to unmarried cohabitation as a
growing living arrangement in the United States and other Western, industrialized societies
(Casper and Bianchi 2002; Kiernan 1999). Cohabitation is so normative that it has even
become a substitute for marriage, and The Netherlands is no exception to this trend. This is
less of a problem for our analysis because a large share of the CCLS men had reached
marriageable age prior to 1970, when cohabitation was far less prevalent. Yet we regard
this topic as an essential avenue for continued exploration, as Lopoo and Western (2005)
and Western (2006) have done.
What is noteworthy, we believe, about the estimates reported herein is that first-time
incarceration in The Netherlands is only three-and-a-half months in length, on average.
This is akin to jail incarceration in the United States. That short-term confinement is
associated with long-term (up to 5 years) marital instability is not encouraging in light of
the expanded use of custodial sanctions in response to crime in The Netherlands and
elsewhere. To be sure, we cannot yet rule out the possibility that underlying differences
between The Netherlands and the United States explain the findings reported here. We thus
believe that confirmation of our results from existing US datasets, using similar methods,
should be a research priority.
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Appendix A
Details on the Estimation of Rosenbaum Bounds for the Average Treatment Effect
of Incarceration on Marriage Formation and Stability
In this appendix, we elaborate on the logic and estimation of ‘‘Rosenbaum bounds’’ for the
sensitivity of the average treatment effect (ATE) to hidden bias. Our description draws
from Rosenbaum (2002), Becker and Caliendo (2007), and DiPrete and Gangl (2004). Our
application involves estimation of the impact of incarceration on the likelihood of marriage
and divorce. The sensitivity analysis begins with the formulation of the usual propensity
score, but supplements the model with an additional, unobserved component:
p ¼ Pr Inc ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ exp aþ bX þ cUð Þ
1 þ exp aþ bX þ cUð Þ
where X are the observed variables, U is an unobserved variable, and a, b, and c are
unknown parameters. Because our model conditions only on individuals who were con-
victed of a crime, we may conceive of U as some kind of ‘‘crime risk trait’’ that is observed
by a sentencing judge but is unobserved by the researcher, and whose presence increases
the probability of receiving a sentence of incarceration by a factor of c. The familiar logit
(log-odds) formulation of this model is represented as:






¼ ln Pr Inc ¼ 1ð Þ
1  Pr Inc ¼ 1ð Þ
 
¼ aþ bX þ cU
and exponentiation leaves us with the odds of incarceration for an arbitrary individual in
the sample:
p
1  p ¼
Pr Inc ¼ 1ð Þ
1  Pr Inc ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ exp a þ bX þ cUð Þ
If there is hidden bias or unobserved confounding, two paired individuals i and j with
the same observed covariates X (or the same propensity score) still have different chances
of being incarcerated. The problem can be illustrated by taking the ratio of the odds of
treatment for these two individuals:




  ¼ exp aþ bXi þ cUið Þ
exp aþ bXj þ cUj
 
where i indexes an incarcerated (treated) individual and j indexes a non-incarcerated
(untreated) individual. Because the propensity score balances X, this odds ratio (or odds
multiplier) can be algebraically simplified:
exp cUið Þ
exp cUj
  ¼ exp c Ui  Uj 
 
A study is free of unobserved confounding only if there are no differences in unob-
servables (i.e., Ui = Uj for all matched pairs i,j), or the unobservables do not influence the
probability of incarceration (i.e., c = 0). In the absence of direct information on the
unobservables, however, Rosenbaum (2002) proposes a simulation that subjects c to per-
turbations as a way to assess its influence on treatment effect estimates. In order to make
the sensitivity analysis tractable, we can impose the simplifying assumption that U is a
dummy variable, that is, it is either present or absent. This implies the following bounds on
the odds ratio that either of two individuals matched on X will be incarcerated:
1
C






C ¼ exp cð Þ
A number of sensitivity statistics are available for matching estimators depending on the
distribution of the response variable and the matching procedure used (for review, see
Rosenbaum 2002). With a binary outcome and one nearest neighbor, we employ Mantel
and Haenszel (1959) test statistic. This is a non-parametric test that compares the observed
number of incarcerated (treated) men that are married (or divorced) to the expected number
given that the treatment effect is zero. We adapt the notation of Becker and Caliendo
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where s represents a single stratum (s = 1,2,…,S) or, in our case, a single matched set and
Y1 = the total number of imprisoned or treated individuals in the sample who are
married (divorced).
Y1s = the total number of imprisoned individuals in matched set s who are married
(divorced).
Ys = the total number of individuals in matched set s who are married (divorced).
N1s = the number of imprisoned individuals in matched set s (=1 in our study).
N0s = the number of non-imprisoned individuals in matched set s (=1 in our study).
Ns = the number of individuals in matched set s.
For fixed C C 1.0 and U [ {0,1}, results shown in Rosenbaum (2002) demonstrate that
QMH can be bounded by two known distributions, providing an upper and lower bound.
Using notation from Becker and Caliendo (2007), the upper and lower bounds, respec-
























, as well as ~Es and
Var ~Es
 
, given in Becker and Caliendo (2007, p. 74, note 5).
Appendix B
See Table 5.
Table 5 Balance diagnostics for imprisoned and non-imprisoned offenders, full and matched samples
Full sample Matched sample
Unmarried Married Unmarried Married
t-stat. ES t-stat. ES t-stat. ES t-stat. ES
Offense characteristics
Category of offense
Simple theft -4.92 -0.18 -1.39 -0.10 0.02 0.00 0.20 0.02
Rape 6.04 0.18 6.35 0.31 -0.02 -0.00 0.34 0.03
Sexual assault 2.19 0.07 2.46 0.15 -1.19 -0.06 -0.34 -0.04
Sexual abuses/other sexual offense 1.76 0.06 -1.72 -0.13 0.68 0.03 -1.49 -0.20
Threatening 2.77 0.09 0.69 0.05 0.81 0.04 -0.76 -0.07
(Attempted) murder/manslaughter 1.93 0.06 2.40 0.13 -0.36 -0.02 0.53 0.06
Assault -0.36 -0.01 0.31 0.02 -0.47 -0.02 0.60 0.06
Violent theft 8.88 0.26 4.79 0.24 0.53 0.02 -0.11 -0.01
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Table 5 continued
Full sample Matched sample
Unmarried Married Unmarried Married
t-stat. ES t-stat. ES t-stat. ES t-stat. ES
Extortion 4.43 0.13 2.74 0.15 1.89 0.08 1.00 0.05
Forgery -1.50 -0.05 -0.18 -0.01 -0.54 -0.02 1.64 0.18
Aggravated assault 7.04 0.24 4.80 0.30 -0.58 -0.03 -0.55 -0.06
Embezzlement -1.59 -0.06 0.20 0.01 -0.31 -0.01 0.04 0.01
Swindling -0.44 -0.02 -0.73 -0.05 -1.11 -0.05 -0.58 -0.08
Fencing -2.42 -0.09 -0.76 -0.05 -0.23 -0.01 0.42 0.05
Public order -2.33 -0.08 -1.24 -0.09 1.41 0.05 -0.82 -0.08
General offending 1.12 0.04 1.63 0.09 1.50 0.07 – –
Offense against authority -3.16 -0.12 -2.47 -0.19 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.00
Flashing -5.05 -0.20 -5.19 -0.42 0.91 0.02 0.00 0.00
Vandalism -8.37 -0.33 -2.66 -0.20 0.12 0.00 0.58 0.05
Other criminal law -2.17 -0.08 -2.36 -0.20 1.46 0.04 -0.81 -0.04
Opium act -0.76 -0.03 1.20 0.08 -0.49 -0.02 0.28 0.03
Weapons act -0.25 -0.01 -0.60 -0.04 -0.16 -0.01 -0.67 -0.09
Severity of offense 7.02 0.24 3.56 0.22 0.55 0.03 -0.13 -0.01
No. crimes in case of conviction
Violent crimes 4.38 0.14 4.09 0.21 -0.19 -0.01 1.22 0.09
Property crimes 13.02 0.39 6.74 0.34 -0.88 -0.00 0.51 0.04
Other crimes 4.20 0.14 3.99 0.23 -0.17 -0.02 1.05 0.11
Criminal history
No. crimes in past 5 years
Violent crimes 0.42 0.01 1.20 0.08 -1.55 -0.07 0.28 0.03
Property crimes 9.16 0.30 3.57 0.23 -0.12 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01
Other crimes 0.67 0.02 0.33 0.02 -1.80 -0.09 1.17 0.13
No. crimes beyond past 5 years
Violent crimes -3.79 -0.14 -1.69 -0.12 -0.65 -0.02 0.15 0.01
Property crimes -3.69 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.36 -0.01 0.55 0.06
Other crimes -3.16 -0.11 -2.40 -0.18 0.51 0.02 0.21 0.02
Early conviction (before age 16) 3.39 0.12 -0.08 -0.01 -0.72 -0.04 -1.18 -0.12
Life circumstances
Current marital and fertility status
Not married—no children 1.13 0.04 – – -0.17 -0.01 – –
Not married—children -0.27 -0.01 – – -0.72 -0.03 – –
Married—no children – – -2.42 -0.17 – – 0.30 0.03
Married—children – – 2.42 0.17 – – -0.30 -0.03
Separated—no children -1.45 -0.05 – – 0.39 0.01 – –
Separated—children -0.54 -0.02 – – 0.77 0.03 – –
Marital and fertility history
No. years married in past 5 years -0.13 -0.00 -1.90 -0.13 1.06 0.04 -0.08 -0.01
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